We develop a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector speci…c factor (e.g., land and capital) and another factor that is mobile between these tradable sectors (labor); one nontradable good, which is also produced using a speci…c factor (skilled labor), and an elected government with the mandate to tax trade ‡ows. The tax revenue is used to provide local public goods that increase the economic agents' utility. We use this general equilibrium model to explicitly derive the preferences of the di¤erent socioeconomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, labor and skilled workers). We then use those derived preferences for policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members of each of these socioeconomic groups. We use this model to shed light on how di¤erences in the comparative advantages of countries explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within countries. We regard trade policy instability to mean that, in equilibrium, political parties diverge in terms of the political platforms they adopt. We show that in natural resource (land) abundant economies with very little capital, or in economies that specializes in the production of manufactures, parties tend to converge to the same policy platform, and trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural resource abundant economy with an important domestic industry that competes with the imports, parties tend to diverge, and trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and unstable.
Introduction
Many developing countries adopted trade protectionist measures during the second part of the twentieth century. Most of these countries, if not all of them, did not have a comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector and they did not industrialize in a sustainable way as a result. Instead, they had a comparative advantage within the primary sector. 1 In contrast, countries with comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector tended to remain much more open to trade. Additionally, the countries that adopted import substitution policies tended to show substantial volatility over time in their trade policies. Consider, just as an example, the case of Argentina. This country is relatively well endowed with highly productive land, and its comparative advantage has always been in the production of primary goods. 2 . Up to the 1930s, Argentina was well integrated to the world economy, and though some protectionism naturally developed during the world recession of the 1930s, only after World War II, when for the …rst time workers massively voted in a presidential election 3 , the country closed itself o¤ in large degree from world markets becoming almost autarkic until the mid-1970s. Since then, though the country tended to reintegrate with the world economy, trade policies were highly volatile. Moroever, Hopenhayn and Neumeyer (2005) argue that this uncertainty about trade policy signi…cantly hampered capital accumulation during this period. 4 This brief sketch is meant to suggest the close and complex connections between political choice and economic structure. Many models of political choice emphasize political convergence to an electoral mean or median. 5 Such models appear to be of limited use in explaining the oscillations that can occur as a result of divergent political choices by parties. Recent developments of the spatial stochastic model suggest, however, that political parties will not converge if there is su¢ cient di¤erence in the valences of political leaders. Scho…eld and Sened (2006) , following Stokes (1963 Stokes ( , 1992 , give this de…nition of valence: Valence relates to voters'judgments about positively or negatively evaluated conditions which they associate with particular parties or candidates. These judgments could refer to party leaders' competence, integrity, moral stance or "charisma" over issues such as the ability to deal with the economy and politics. The important point to note is that these individual judgments are independent of the positions of the voter and party. Scho…eld and Sened (2006) review the evidence for a number of countries, and they conclude that there is no indication of convergence of the positions of party leaders. 6 Scho…eld and Cataife (2007) studied the 1989 and 1995 elections in Argentina, and also found that party platforms did not converge.
In this paper we develop a stochastic model of electoral competition to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector speci…c factor (land and capital) and a third factor (e.g., labor) which is mobile between these tradable sectors. There is also one non-tradable good, which is produced using a speci…c factor (skilled labor). The political model has an elected government with the mandate to …x an ad valorem import tax rate. The tax revenue is used to provide two local public goods. One public good is targeted at the speci…c factors of production while the other is targeted at the mobile factor of production. We use this general equilibrium model to explicitly derive the preferences of the di¤erent socioeconomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, workers and service workers). We then use those derived preferences for political policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members of each of these socioeconomic groups. The combined model is thus based on micro-political economy foundations of citizens preferences. We believe this paper is the …rst to employs this methodology in order to study how di¤erences in the factor endowments of countries explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within countries. Trade policy instability requires that political parties diverge in equilibrium over the political economic platforms that they present to the electorate, and commit to implement if elected.
Just as in Helpman (1994, 1996) we consider two interconnected sources of political in ‡uence: electoral competition and interest groups. In their study of the political economy of protection Grossman and Helpman proposed a model of protection in which economic interests organize along sectoral lines, so that interest groups form to represent industries. Their model predicts a cross-sectional structure of protection, depending on political and economic characteristics, and provides an excellent model of within country cross-section variability of trade policy. In contrast, we focus on the variability of trade policy both across countries and within a country over time, rather than across sectors.
Our work is related to Roemer (2001) , which presents several models of political competition in which the central economic dimension is the distributive con ‡ict among di¤erent socioeconomic groups. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) o¤er a theory of political transition that uses the distributive con ‡ict between the rich and the poor as the main driving force behind political change, and they also stress structural di¤erences between rural elites (landlords) and urban elites (industrialists) in highlighting important equilibrium institutional di¤erences across countries (see also Acemoglu et al. [2008] ). Since we emphasize redistributive con ‡ict as the main determinant of trade policy, our work is also related to the analysis of Rogowski (1987 Rogowski ( , 1989 on the e¤ects of international trade on political alignments (see also Baldwin [1989] ). Rogowski combines the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (Stolper and Samuelson [1941] ) and Becker's theory of competition among pressure groups (Becker [1983] ) to elaborate a lucid explanation of political cleavages, as well as changes in those cleavages over time as a consequence of exogenous shocks in the risk and cost of foreign trade. 7 The beauty of Stolper-Samuelson is that it identi…es winners and losers in free trade in simple economies. For example, it explains why in nineteenth Century England capitalists and workers united in favor of free trade against the landowner elite; while American capitalists and workers did the same but with a di¤erent objective: protectionism. Rogowski (1987) classi…es economies according to their factor endowments of capital, land and labor, and uses his classi…cation to deduce two main types of political cleavages: a class cleavage and a urbanrural cleavage. The model that we present includes non-tradable goods and this allows for a richer characterization of political alignments. In particular, in natural resource (land) abundant economies, without the inclusion of non-tradable goods, landlords favor free trade, and industrialists and workers are protectionist, inducing a urban-rural cleavage. However, once non-tradable goods are introduced in the model, distributive con ‡ict among urban groups will also be present. Industrialists and unskilled workers may favor protectionist policies while skilled workers favor free trade policies (see Galiani, Heymann, and Magud [2009] ). Furthermore, we show that the presence of a distributive con ‡ict between urban groups can have interesting political e¤ects in the determination of trade policy.
We construct a taxonomy to classify di¤erent economies given their economic structures: 1) Natural resource-rich economies. This set comprises countries that are highly abundant in the factor speci…c to the less labor-intensive tradable industry (land). They specialize in the production of primary goods.
2) Diversi…ed natural resource-rich economies. They comprise countries that are moderately abundant in the factor speci…c to the less labor intensive tradable industry (land), but they display an important activity in the production of the two tradable goods.
3) Industrial economies. They comprise countries relatively scarcely endowed with natural resources that are either relatively abundant in the factor speci…c to the more labor-intensive tradeable industry (capital) or are highly endowed with the mobile factor of production (labor).
We show that in a natural resource abundant economy with very little capital, or in an economy with comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector (i.e., industrial economies), political parties tend to converge to the same policy platform. Trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural resource abundant economy with an important domestic industry which competes with imports, parties tend to diverge. Trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and unstable. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in O'Rourke and Taylor (2006) who show that, in the late nineteenth century, democratization led to more liberal trade policies in countries where workers stood to gain from free trade. Using more recent evidence, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) show that individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative disadvantage tend to be more protectionist than individuals in sectors with a revealed comparative advantage. They also show that individuals in non-tradable sectors tend to be the most pro-trade of all workers.
We also show that when policy platforms diverge the economic structure in ‡uences the pattern of divergence. In particular, in specialized natural resource-rich and industrial economies, parties tend to propose very similar trade policies, but they di¤er in their budget allocation proposal. Thus, distributional con ‡ict mainly occurs in the budget allocation, which does not a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the economy. On the other hand, in diversi…ed natural resource-rich economies parties tend to di¤er in both dimensions. Thus, party rotation induces signi…cant changes in the e¢ ciency of the economy since each party implements a very di¤erent trade policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our simple general equilibrium model of a small open economy. We …nd and characterize the competitive equilibrium of the model, as well as the induced preferences over policies of each group of agents. In section 3 we introduce the stochastic spatial electoral model with exogenous valence, and we use it to study the political economy of trade policy. Section 3.1 presents the conditions for convergence to a weighted political mean. In section 3.2 we emphasize that political convergence depends both on political parameters, such as heterogeneity of political perceptions, and on economic structure, namely the electoral covariance matrix of economic preferences. In section 3.3 we show how the structure of the economy a¤ects policy choices, in particular the equilibrium trade policy. Section 4 extends the stochastic electoral model to include interest groups. In section 4.1 we extend the model to incorporate interest groups. In section 4.2 we study how interest groups a¤ect the political economic equilibrium. In section 4.3 we brie ‡y discuss how interest groups a¤ect political convergence. In section 4.4 we characterize an equilibrium in which parties' platforms diverge. Finally, section 5 o¤ers brief concluding remarks.
The economy
In this section we develop a static model of a small open economy and characterize the indirect utility functions of the di¤erent groups in society. Consider a factor speci…c static model of an open economy with two tradable goods, labeled X and Y , and a non-tradable good, labeled N . Good X (Y ) is produced employing a factor speci…c to industry X (Y ), denoted F X (F Y ), and labor, which can move between tradable industries without friction, denoted L. Let L X (L Y ) be the amount of L employed in industry X (Y ). 8 Production functions are assumed to be Cobb Douglas with di¤erent factor intensities:
We assume, without lose of generality, that X > Y . The nontradable good is produced employing labor speci…c to industry N , denoted F N , with the linear production function:
Here Q k (k = X; Y; N ) is the total output of good k. The aggregate vector endowment of factors is e = F X ; F Y ; F N ; L . We focus on the functional distribution of income. Therefore, we only consider four socioeconomic groups associated with the resources they control: for example, natural resources, capital, labor and skilled labor. The society we have in mind is one composed of landlords, industrialists (owning sector speci…c capital), workers (mobile factor between tradable industries) and service workers. We identify the later with skilled workers. 9 A household of type k owns k n k units of factor k, and zero units of all the other factors, where n k represents the population belonging to group k. All individuals have the same utility function. This is Cobb Douglas in private goods and separable in a local public good:
Here c i;k l is the consumption of the private good l = X; Y; N by individual i of type k (0 < l < 1, with X l=X;Y;N l = 1). G k is the consumption of a local public good, and H is an strictly increasing and concave function. Let C p l be the aggregate consumption of private good l = X; Y; N consumed by the private sector.
In order to avoid distorting the private good markets merely due to the public sector utilization of private goods as its inputs of production we assume that the government also has a Cobb Douglas production function with the same coe¢ cients of the utility function
Here C g l is the amount of good l = X; Y; N used as input by the public sector 10 , and
Even though we do not need this assumption to obtain our results, it simpli…es the analysis below. These local public goods are just a convenient way of handling transfers in kind to di¤erent groups in society.
In particular, we assume that the government provides two local public goods: one that bene…ts speci…c factors, denoted G F , and the other that bene…ts the mobile factor, denoted G L . These are associated, respectively, with the upper and middle-class groups and the low-income group. Finally, we assume that the economy is small in the sense that it cannot a¤ect the international prices of tradable goods p = (p X ; p Y ). Then, a feasible allocation for this economy is given as follows:
such that:
Competitive equilibrium
Since the government can tax exports and impose import tari¤s, domestic prices may di¤er from international prices. Let p = (p X ; p Y ; p N ) be the vector of domestic good prices, and w = (w F X ; w F Y ; w F N ; w L ) be the vector of factor prices, where w k is the rental rate of factor k. Due to Lerner's theorem export taxes are equivalent to import tari¤s. Thus, without lose of generality, we assume that the government only taxes exports at the rate 0.
De…nition 2 A competitive equilibrium for an economy with endowment e, international prices p and export tax rate 0 is a list (x; p; w), such that x is a feasible allocation, each …rm maximizes pro…ts given (p; w), each individual maximizes utility given (p; w), and p satis…es
Here i is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the economy has a comparative advantage in industry i = X; Y and 0 otherwise.
Let Q X ( Q Y ) be the maximum output of industry X (Y ) given the aggregate endowment e, so
Pro…t maximization in industry Y implies
Finally, the zero pro…t condition in industry N , implies
Under the Cobb Douglas utility assumption, expenditure shares are constant, so
From pro…t maximization in industries X and Y , and the connection between domestic and international prices we obtain
From pro…t maximization in the nontradable industry and the relation between expenditure shares we obtain
Note that the right hand side of equation (1) A direct application of the implicit function theorem implies that these functions are continuously di¤erentiable. Analogously, let w k ( ) denotes the equilibrium nominal factor price for factor k, and de…ne the equilibrium consumer price index as the following geometric average of the prices of consumption goods
De…nition 3 De…ne the economy degree of comparative advantage in industry Y by (1) and (2) we obtain:
where
is the share of the export good in the total tradable output evaluated at international prices. The interpretation of (4) and (5) is straightforward. If the economy has a comparative advantage in industry X; an increase in the export tax rate decreases the domestic price of good X, and hence some workers leave industry X and move to industry Y (i.e. l Y ( ) is a strictly increasing function). On the other hand, if the economy has a comparative advantage in industry Y , an increase in the export tax rate reduces the domestic price of good Y , and hence some workers reallocate to industry X. That is, l Y ( ) is a strictly decreasing function.
No matter what the comparative advantage of the economy, an increase in the export tax rate always generates a reduction in the aggregate output of the tradable industries, measured at international prices. Since the total demand of the nontradable good is proportional to p X Q X + p Y Q Y , this reduction induces a contraction in the demand of the nontradable good, and hence a decrease in the price of the nontradable good. Thus p N ( ) is a strictly decreasing function.
De…nition 4 Let aut be the tax rate on exports that pushes the economy into autarky. 11 Lemma 2 Speci…c Factor prices: The real rental factor prices of the factor speci…c to the exporting industry and the nontradable industry are decreasing in the export tax rate for all 2 [0; aut ]; while the real rental factor price of the factor speci…c to the import competing industry is increasing in the export tax rate for all 2 [0; aut ]. Proof: See the appendix.
The interpretation of lemma 2 is as follows. On the one hand, an increase in the export tax rate reduces the domestic relative price of the exporting industry and hence the real rental price of the factor speci…c to this industry. On the other hand, an increase in the export tax rate increases the domestic relative price of the industry that competes with imports, and hence it increases the real rental price of the factor speci…c to that industry. The real wage paid in the nontradable industry also decreases when the export tax rate increases since the demand of the nontradable good is proportional to the income generated in the tradable industries, which varies inversely with the export tax rate.
It is more subtle to see what happen with the real wage paid in the tradable industries. There are three e¤ects operating on the real wage, and they can operate in opposite directions.
First, the increase in the export tax rate reduces the domestic price of the exported good, and, for a given allocation of labor between tradable industries, this reduces the nominal wage in the same 1 1 aut depends on the factor endowments and the international terms of trade. See the appendix.
amount. Second, the export tax also reduces the domestic relative price of the exported good relative to imported good and, hence labor reallocates to the industry that competes with the imports, and this can counterbalance or reinforce the reduction in the nominal wage since industries di¤ers in their labor intensity. Third, as the export tax rate increases there is a reduction in the domestic price of exported goods. This increases the real wage. There is also a reduction in the aggregate output of the tradable industries measured at international prices, and this reduces the price of nontradable goods, which increases the real wage.
The following lemma formally characterizes the e¤ect of the export tax rate on real wages. 
, where aut: = 1 + The interpretation of lemma 3 is as follows. If the economy is completely specialized in the production of the less labor intensive tradable good (X), then the nominal wage changes one to one with the domestic price of X, and the price of the nontradable good reduces proportionally less than the domestic price of X. The reason for this is that the export tax does not generate any productive distortion in the production of good X, and the consumption distortion has a relatively mild e¤ect on the price of the nontradable good.
If the economy has a comparative advantage in the less labor-intensive industry, but it is not completely specialized, an increase in the export tax rate induces a reallocation of labor toward the more labor intensive industry (Y ), which counterbalances the initial reduction in the nominal wage. For this counterbalancing e¤ect to be of importance, the amount of the industry Y speci…c factor must be high enough. The reduction in the price of nontradable goods associated with an increase in the export tax rate reinforces the increase in the real wage.
Finally, if the economy has a comparative advantage in the more labor-intensive industry, the export tax produces a reallocation of labor to the less labor-intensive industry, which reinforces the initial reduction in the nominal wage. Since, the price of the nontradable good also decreases, the e¤ect on the real wage is in principle ambiguous. However, if industry X is intensive enough in the speci…c factor (condition 1 in the lemma), and the comparative advantage in industry Y is not extremely high (condition 2 in the lemma), the decrease in the nominal wage is relatively high, and the decrease in the price of the nontradable good, which is proportional to the distortion, is relatively moderate.
In principle, Lemma 3 does not exhaust all situations. For the domain 0 < <
the e¤ect of the tax rate on the real wage is ambiguous. However, we simulated the model for reasonable values of the parameters and we found that the real wage always decreases for low values of the tax rate and then increases for high values of the tax rate. Moreover, for strictly positive, but small values of , the maximum real wage is at = 0. For higher values of the maximum real wage is at = aut: . Regarding the domain in which neither condition 1 nor condition 2 holds, we also simulated the model for reasonable values of the parameters and found that the su¢ cient conditions in Lemma 3 are far from being necessary. Thus, Lemma 3 and the simulations we conducted suggest the following taxonomy of economic structures: 1) Natural resource-rich economies. This set comprises countries that are highly abundant in the factor speci…c to the less labor-intensive tradable industry (land). They specialize in the production of primary goods.
Note, however, that this taxonomy is a static one. An economy with a given endowment vector e could be classi…ed, for example, either under the category 1 or 2 depending on, among other things, the international relative price of the tradable goods (see Galiani and Somaini [2009] ). Additionally, the vector endowment e could evolve over time. In particular, physical and human capital accumulation have the potential to change signi…cantly.
Many economies can be accommodated within this taxonomy. Economies highly endowed with natural resources (relative to capital and labor), such as, for example, Argentina before the 1930 crisis, or most OPEC countries, can be regarded as having a type 1 economic structure. However, Argentina, after the War World II, is better classi…ed as having a type 2 economic structure (see Galiani and Somaini [2009] ). Actually, most economies well endowed with natural resources and which adopted import substitution policies moved from a type 1 to a type 2 economic structure. Many backward economies, such as those of Africa, can also be seen to have a type 2 economic structure, even though they might not have an important industrial sector. In this case, the agricultural sector acts as the sector intensive in the use of labor (L), while the exporting sector exploits the endowment of a speci…c natural resource (e.g., diamonds in Bostwana). Finally, type 3 economies consist of two types. First are those that are highly endowed with capital (relative to natural resources and labor) such as all highly developed countries, Second are those highly endowed with labor (L) that export labor intensive manufactured goods such as it is the case of China today. 12 
The policy space and indirect utility functions
Real government revenue is given by
where Q l ( ) and C l ( ) measure respectively the equilibrium production and consumption of good l = X; Y .
R( )
CP I( ) has the typical inverted U shape with zeros at = 0 and = aut and a maximum at max given by 1
In equilibrium, Q G = R( ) CP I( ) . Suppose, however, that a fraction of the public goods vanishes in the process of distributing it, possibly due to corruption or any other form of rent dissipation prevalent in the operation of the public sector. This assumption, though realistic, is not crucial in deriving the results of the paper below but it facilitates the analysis. Then,
where 2 [0; 1] is the fraction of government revenue allocated to the provision of G L (1 is the fraction allocated to G F ), and A (:) is an strictly increasing and concave function such that: A ( ) , A (0) = 0, and A 0 (1) = 0.
From equations (6) and (8) we see that public decisions are restricted to a two dimensional space: the government must set the export tax rate and the fraction of revenue assigned to the provision of each local public good.
De…nition 5
The policy space of an economy with endowment vector e and international prices p is given by
Here is the tax rate on exports and is the fraction of government revenue allocated to the provision of G L .
Clearly, Z is a convex and compact subset of the semipositive quadrant < 2 + . Since preferences are represented by Cobb Douglas utility functions, the indirect utility function of each individual is given by a geometric average of his real income using the consumer price index as de ‡ator and the amount of the local public good consumed by the individual. Formally,
De…nition 6 The indirect utility function of an individual belonging to group
where L = ,and
For each group in society, its ideal policy is the point in the policy space Z that maximizes its indirect utility function (10). 1 3 Note that max depends on the factor endowments and the international terms of trade.
Lemma 4 Ideal policies. Let z k = k ; k denote the ideal policy for an individual from group k.
. Then, for economies characterized by structure 1,
The ideal policy for each socioeconomic group is the key economic input of the political game that we develop in the next section. Note, in particular, how these ideal policies vary with di¤erent economic structures. In an economy highly abundant in the factor speci…c to the less labor intensive tradable industry (structure 1), the only protectionist demand appears from the group that owns the factor speci…c to the import competing industry. For an economy abundant in the factor speci…c to the more labor-intensive tradable industry (structure 3), the only protectionist group is the one that owns the factor speci…c to the import competing industry. However, in an economy moderately abundant in the factor speci…c to the less labor intensive tradable industry (structure 2), there are a number of possible opposed groups. There are two protectionist groups, those owning F Y or L, while the groups owning F X or F N lose from protection.
The Polity
In this section we introduce the stochastic spatial model of electoral competition. We begin with a formal de…nition of the stochastic spatial model as a game in normal form. We de…ne and discuss an equilibrium concept for this game, and study the conditions under which parties converge to a weighted electoral mean. We then use the model to study the political determination of trade policies in the economy we study.
The stochastic spatial model with exogenous valence
The timing of events is as follows (Person and Tabellini 4) The elected candidate implements the announced platform. Let P = f1; :::; pg be the set of all political parties. Each party j 2 P selects a platform z j = j ; j from the policy space Z. We let Z = j2P Z. A pro…le of party platforms is denoted z 2 Z. When necessary we use the notation z j to represent the pro…le of platforms of all parties except party j. The preferences of party j 2 P is given by its expected vote share function S j : Z ! [0; 1] :
Here k j (z) is the probability that a voter in group k votes for party j, while V = fF X ; F Y ; F N ; Lg is the set of all groups of voters, and n k is the proportion of the population in group k.
The utility associated with a given voter in group k when party j implements platform z j is given by
where (a) z k = k ; k 2 Z is the ideal policy for the voters in group k; (b) k > 0 ( k > 0) measures the importance that voters in group k assign to the export tax rate (the local public good); and (c) j + " k j is the private signal received by a voter in group k about party j 0 s valence. We shall assume that the expected value of this signal is j , and is common to all groups 14 , and the error vector " k = (" k 1 ; ::; " k p ) has a cumulative stochastic distribution denoted F k . We assume below that F k is the Type 1 extreme value distribution, the same for all k:
The utility function (12) requires some explanation. Note that we do not use the indirect utility functions over policies (10) to capture the preferences of the di¤erent socioeconomic groups. Instead we use a weighted Euclidean metric, given by the distance from the policy proposed by the j th party, z j , to the optimal policy, z k , for each group k. The model can be developed using the indirect utility functions, at the cost of analytical tractability (since the true indirect utility functions have very complicated expressions, or even no closed form solution). Additionally, the convergence theorems that we use below have a much easier implementation under the weighted Euclidean preference assumption adopted here. Furthermore, it is possible to justify the weighted Euclidean preferences (12) as a second order Taylor approximation of the indirect utility function of each group (10) around their preferred policies:
Here the operator D (D 2 ) indicates derivative of order 1 (2), and Dv k z k = 0 since z k is the ideal policy for voters in group k. Our Euclidean metric approximation assumes that D 2 v k z k is a diagonal matrix, which holds in our case since
Candidates do not know the private signal received by each individual voter, but the probability distribution of these signals in each group of the electorate is common knowledge. Let F k be the cumulative distribution function of " k 1 ; :::; " k p . Then the probability that a voter in group k selects party j is given by
Here Pr is inferred from the cumulative distribution function, F k . Finally, we order parties according to their expected valence: p ::: 1 .
De…nition 7
The stochastic spatial model with exogenous valence is the game in normal form exo: = hP; Z; Si, where 1. Players: P = f1; :::; pg is the set of political parties. 2. Set of strategies: Z is the policy space de…ned in section 2 and Z = j2P Z is the space of all strategy pro…les.
3. Utility functions: S j : Z ! [0; 1] is the expected vote share function of party j 2 P deduced from (12) and (13) and S = j2P S j .
We solve this game by …nding its local Nash equilibrium.
De…nition 8 A strict (weak) local Nash equilibrium of the stochastic spatial model exo: = hP; Z; Si is a vector of party positions z such that for each party j 2 P , there exists an -neighborhood
Remark 1. A local Nash equilibrium is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE) if we can substitute Z for B (z j ) in the above de…nition.
Remark 2. It is usual in general equilibrium theory to use …rst order conditions, based on calculus techniques, to determine the nature of the critical equilibrium. Because production sets and consumer preferred sets are usually assumed to be convex, the Brower's …xed point theorem can then be used to assert that the critical equilibrium is a Walrasian equilibrium. However, in political models, the critical equilibrium may be characterized by positive eigenvalues for the Hessian of one of the political parties. As a consequence the utility function (expected vote share function) of such a party will fail pseudo-concavity. Therefore, none of the usual …xed point arguments can be used to assert existence of a "global" Nash equilibrium. For this reason we use the concept of a "critical Nash equilibrium", namely a vector of strategies which satis…es the …rst order condition for a local maximum of the utility functions of the parties. A "Local Nash Equilibrium" (LNE) satis…es the …rst order condition, together with the second order condition that the Hessians of all parties are negative (semi-) de…nite at the vector that satis…es the …rst order condition. Clearly, this local Nash property is necessary for a vector to be a Nash equilibrium. Once the LNE are determined, then simulation can be used to determine if one of them is a Nash equilibrium.
We are interested in studying the conditions under which political parties converge to the same platform, or else diverge and o¤er di¤erent platforms to the electorate. Although it is possible to consider several speci…cations for the distribution function of the valence signals we only develop a relatively simple version that assumes that the valence signals are distributed according to the Type 1 extreme value distribution (see Scho…eld and Sened [2006] ; Scho…eld [2007] ). This assumption has the advantage that it is the usual stochastic assumption used in conditional logit models of elections.
Let ; = X k2V n k k ; k be the average importance that voters give to the tax rate and the local public goods, respectively. Then, de…ne the weighted mean of the electoral ideal policies, or weighted electoral mean z m = ( m ; m ) by
Note that z m is just a weighted average of the ideal policies of each group, where the weights take into account the fraction of voters in each group (n k ) and the importance that each group gives to each policy dimension relative to the average importance in the population ( k = and k = ). 15 We call z m = j2P z m 2 Z the joint weighted electoral mean of the stochastic spatial model.
Under the assumption of the Type 1 extreme value distribution, the probability that a voter in group k votes for party j at a pro…le z 2 Z can be shown to be:
The objective of party j is to maximize its expected vote share, that is
Since S j (z) is continuously di¤erentiable we can use calculus to solve this problem. The …rst order necessary condition is
If all candidates adopt the same policy position, so z 0 = j2P z 0 , say, then k j (z 0 ) is independent of k and may be written j (z 0 ). Assuming that j (z 0 ) 6 = 0, the …rst order condition becomes
Therefore, if each party proposes z m = ( m ; m ), the …rst order condition of all parties is satis…ed. We say that the joint weighted electoral mean, z m satis…es the …rst order condition for LNE. The second order su¢ cient (necessary) condition for equilibrium at z is that the matrix D 2 S j (z) evaluated at z be negative de…nite (semide…nite). Earlier results in Scho…eld (2007) can be generalized to show that
k is a weighted average of the ideal points of each group of voters, where the weights are the sizes of the groups.
De…nition 9 Considering the model exo: = hP; Z; Si when F k is the Type 1 extreme value distribution for all k, we de…ne:
1. The probability j (z m ) that a voter in group k votes for party j at the pro…le z m is
(Note that j (z m ) only depends on the valence terms, and not on the party platforms.)
2. De…ne the coe¢ cient A j of party j by
6. De…ne the convergence coe¢ cients of the model to be
Here Tr(M) means the trace of the matrix M. A result of Scho…eld (2007) can be generalized to the case here, of multiple groups in the economy, to show that the Hessian, D 2 S j (z m ) of party j at z m can be expressed in terms of the characteristic matrix. Thus
The following proposition establishes necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the joint weighted electoral mean to be an equilibrium of the electoral game.
Proposition 1 Assume that F k is the Type 1 extreme value distribution for all k: A su¢ cient condition for the joint weighted electoral mean, z m ; to be a strict local Nash equilibrium of the stochastic spatial model exo: = hP; Z; Si is c ( exo: ) < 1. A necessary condition for z m to be a local Nash equilibrium is d ( exo: ) 1. Proof: See the appendix.
If the convergence conditions hold, then the equilibrium prediction of the outcome of the electoral game is the weighted electoral mean of the ideal points z m = ( m ; m ). Although it does not follow directly from the Proposition 1, simulation of a number of such electoral games shows that, when the su¢ cient convergence condition is satis…ed, then z m is the unique PNE. There can be two or more parties and the expected vote share of each party may di¤er, but the policy outcome will not be a¤ected, since all parties implement z m . Thus, di¤erent policies can only be the consequence of di¤erences in the economic and political parameters that determine z m . On the other hand, if the necessary convergence condition fails, then parties'platforms do not converge in equilibrium. In this case, di¤erent policies have a positive probability of being implemented.
Next, we study how the economic structure and the parameters of the electoral game a¤ect z m and the convergence coe¢ cients.
Trade policy under convergence
We …rst consider the situation in which the su¢ cient condition for convergence holds. Then Proposition 1 implies that the outcome of the electoral game is the weighted electoral mean z m = ( m ; m ). We now characterize z m for the three economic structures identi…ed in section 2. From lemma 3, it is always the case that k = 0 for k = F X ; F Y ; F N and L = 1. Therefore, m = n L L = , which only depends on the parameters of the electoral game and not on those parameters that de…ne the di¤erent economic structures. Moreover, it is not di¢ cult to see how the parameters of the electoral game a¤ect m . Ceteris paribus, the higher the fraction of workers in the tradable industries in the population (n L ), and the more sensitive they are to changes in the provision of the local public good, measured by ( L = ), the higher the fraction of the government revenue expended in G L in equilibrium. 16 Conversely, the ideal export tax rate for each group varies across the di¤erent economic structures. From lemma 3, we know that for a structure 1 economy, with highly abundant factor F X (e.g., land), then F N < max and L < max , while for a structure 2 economy we have F N < max < L . Therefore, the electoral equilibrium m would be lower in an economy with structure 1 than in one with structure 2. Moreover, it is likely that the magnitude of this di¤erence would be large. To see this note that, in a natural resource-abundant economy, all socioeconomic groups, except for the owners of factor F Y (e.g., industrialists), have an ideal export tax rate below max . Hence, unless the owners of factor F Y are much more responsive to tax policy changes than the rest of the voters, m is strictly less than max . In fact it can be very low. For example, the negative impact of the export tax on real wages in the tradable industries can be large. However, in an economy with structure 2, workers in the tradable industries have an ideal tax rate above max , so it can even be the case that in equilibrium m > max . For example, the workers in the tradable industries may be an important fraction of the population as well as being highly responsive to trade policies.
An economy with structure 3 is analogous to an economy with structure 1, with the ideal export tax rates of the owners of factors F X and F Y reversed. Therefore, m is also lower for an economy with structure 3 than for an economy with structure 2. Finally, note that irrespective of the economic structure, ceteris paribus, the higher the fraction of service workers in the population (n F N ), or the more sensitive they are to changes in the export tax rate, measured by ( F N = ), the lower the equilibrium
m is. This is particularly relevant for economies with structure 2. Thus, it is not the case that natural resource abundant economies will necessary have populist political cleavages as postulated in Rogowski (1987 Rogowski ( , 1989 .
In summary, if the economy is either highly abundant in the factor speci…c to the less labor intensive tradable industry (structure 1), or either abundant in the factor speci…c to the more labor intensive tradable industry or in labor L (structure 3), the electoral equilibrium is likely to be relatively close to free trade. In this case, the great majority of the population loses with the adoption of protectionist policies. However, if the economy resembles the characteristics of the economic structure 2, society is split into two groups: owners of factor F X and service workers who favor a relatively free trade policy, while owners of factor F Y and workers L in the tradable industries prefer a more protectionist policy. The equilibrium tax rate is higher in this third case than in the …rst two cases, and so is the level of distortion in the economy. The development of the non-tradable sector plays a key role in political cleavages however. The reason is that service workers push the political equilibrium toward the ideal position of the relative abundant factor in the economy. Therefore, they act as a moderating force against the protectionist tendency.
Economic structure and divergence
As we showed in the previous section, given that the convergence condition holds, we can then explain how trade policy at a given time depends on the prevalent economic structure. Now, we investigate the convergence conditions under the three di¤erent economic structures derived in Section 2 and study how di¤erent economic structures a¤ect the stability of trade policy.
First of all, however, we need to de…ne what we mean by stability of a policy in our model. We interpret convergence of political parties to the same political platform as stability of policies. Indeed, if in equilibrium all political parties converge to the same platform, although there can be uncertainty about which party wins the election, there is complete certainty about the policy outcome. If, instead, in equilibrium the political parties do not converge to the same platform, then there are di¤erent policies with positive probability of being implemented. This means that we could observe di¤erent policies in a given economy over time. In this sense, an economic structure that induces political convergence is one that gives rise to stable policy outcomes. These will change smoothly in response to shocks to the distribution of political power, the international terms of trade or technology. An economic structure that induces political divergence is one that generates a more volatile environment, where we can observe (possibly large) changes in policies even without any change in the economic or political fundamentals.
Proposition 1 show that a su¢ cient condition for convergence to z m is c ( exo: ) < 1, while a necessary condition is d ( exo: ) 1: These convergence coe¢ cients, c ( exo: ) and d ( exo: ) ; depend on the stochastic distribution of the valence signals as well as the distribution of the ideal policies in the population. We now compare the convergent coe¢ cients for di¤erent economic structures. Since the key di¤erence among economic structures is the ideal trade policy for the workers of the tradable industries, we consider d ( exo: ) as a function of L ; keeping constant all the other variables that determine it. Note that d ( exo: ) is a quadratic and symmetric function and has a minimum at the value of L that satis…es the following equation
The second term in the squared brackets is very small in absolute value (in fact, it equals zero if k is the same for all groups). Hence,
depends primarily on m L . If the economy has structure
but very small. Therefore, for an economy with structure 1,
) is very close to its minimum. This is also the case for economies with structure 3. On the other hand, for an economy with structure 2, F X < F N < max < L < F Y , which implies that unless n F X << n F Y , m L is negative and large in absolute value, and hence d ( exo: ) is far from its minimum. Since
@ L = , the same argument also apply to the coe¢ cient c ( exo: ). Thus, convergence coe¢ cients tend to be larger than their minimum values for diversi…ed natural resource-rich economies (structure 2) but very close to their minimum values for natural resource-rich economies (structure 1) and industrial economies (structure 2). If the convergence coe¢ cients for a particular polity are large, then we can say, informally, that the likelihood of convergence is lower. This allows us to infer that policy stability in economies with structures 1 or 3 is more likely than in economies with structure 2. 17 The above argument has focused on the dependence of the convergence coe¢ cients on the weighted electoral variance-covariance matrix. It is also worth mentioning that the convergence coe¢ cients also depend on the parameters of the electoral game. Under the assumptions made on the stochastic distribution, we see that A 1 = 2 (1 2 1 (z m )) ; so if 1 (z m ) is small then A 1 is large, as are the convergence coe¢ cients. Thus convergence is less likely the greater the di¤erence in exogenous valences. In particular, in a two party system, if 2 1 then the model predicts policy convergence. On the other hand, in a fragmented polity, with small low valence parties, one expects policy divergence. 18 , 19 Thus, political divergence is a consequence of both political and economic forces. Policy divergence is a pure political issue related to electoral competition. Voters have di¤erent perceptions of the average quality of the political parties, and these are independent of the platform they propose. These perceptions a¤ect voting probabilities in such a way that candidates or party leaders need not locate at the center of the policy space. However, di¤erences in valences alone are not enough to induce political divergence. As proposition 1 clearly shows, the convergence coe¢ cients depend on the electoral variance-covariance matrix. If the trace of this matrix is large, then convergence is less likely. Politics makes policy divergence possible, but economic forces are needed to induce it, since it is heterogeneity in policy preferences that fundamentally determines the convergence coe¢ cients.
Extension: Parties and Organizations
In this section we extend the stochastic spatial model of electoral competition presented in Section 3 by including organizations that try to in ‡uence political outcomes through campaign contributions. We 1 7 For example, empirical analysis of the 2000 presidential election in the U.S. estimated c ( exo:) to be 0:37 (Scho…eld et al. [2010b] ). This analysis estimated the valences of the candidates on the basis of a two dimension policy model. 1 8 For example, empirical analysis of the 2002 election in Turkey estimated c ( exo:) to be 5:49, while for the 1996 election in Israel it was 3:98 (Scho…eld et al. [2010a,b] , respectively). Both polities are highly fragmented. The analyses estimated the valences of the party leaders on the basis of a two dimension policy model involving economic issues and nationalism. The policy spaces were di¤erent from those analyzed here. Nonetheless, the results are indicative of the point made here. 1 9 Similar results hold under the assumption that valence signals have a stochastic Gaussian distribution, rather than the Type I.
formally de…ne this extension as a two stage dynamic game and de…ne an equilibrium concept for this dynamic game. We then study the convergence conditions and characterize the equilibrium outcome of the political game when there is no convergence. There are two motivations for introducing organizations into the basic political model developed in Section 3. First, without their inclusion, when the convergence conditions do not hold, we can say little about the electoral outcome beyond divergence. Second, even in a perfect democracy, the political power of groups di¤ers from the extent of their political power in terms of their numbers alone.
The stochastic spatial model with exogenous and endogenous valence
We now assume that there exist political organizations other than political parties. These organizations are independent, with their own agenda, but may be linked to parties in various ways. An example is that of unions, which try to in ‡uence political outcomes through campaign contributions. Contributions are valuable for politicians because they can be used to increase the electorate's perceived quality of a candidate or to discredit political rivals. Thus, valence becomes an endogenous variable that depends on campaign contributions. Grossman and Helpman (1996) consider two distinct motives for interest groups: "Contributors with an electoral motive intend to promote the electoral prospects of preferred candidates. Those with an in ‡uence motive aim to in ‡uence the politicians' policy pronouncements." The model presented here is a generalization of Scho…eld (2006) , which in principle, captures both motives, as suggested in Scho…eld (2003, 2008) and Scho…eld and Miller (2007) . However, in the proposition presented below we consider an example that captures the electoral motive, but not the in ‡uence motive. Except for the introduction of these organizations, the stochastic spatial model remains fundamentally the same as the model with exogenous valence.
As before, the timing of the events is as follows:
(1) Organizations simultaneously announce their campaign contribution functions, specifying the contributions they will make in response to the party electoral platforms.
(2) Political parties simultaneously announce their electoral platforms. Suppose that each group of voters has an organization that can make contributions to political campaigns, and assume that due to institutional constraints, political parties cannot transfer money or resources to organizations, so contributions must be nonnegative. Let c k : Z ! j2P < + = C denote a contribution function made by organization k, and let C denote the space of all feasible contribution functions. Let C = k2V C . A pro…le of contribution functions is denoted by c = k2V c k . When necessary we use the notation c k to denote the pro…le of contribution functions of all organizations except k.
The utility of a voter belonging to group k when party j implements platform z j is now
The last term is the endogenous valence function j : C ! < + , which captures the impact of contributions on valence values. 20 As before, the probability that a voter from group k votes for party j is given by:
We assume that each organization has a leader, who collects contributions from its members and uses them to support political parties in their electoral campaigns. Each leader receives a "payment" that depends linearly on the policy preferences of the members of the organization, and must pay the cost of collecting the contributions among its members. Following Persson and Tabellini (2000) we assume that these costs are a quadratic function in the per member contribution since the free rider problem in collective action is more severe in large groups. The leader maximizes his expected payment net of the costs of collecting contributions. Thus, the preference of leader k is given by the function
Here c k;j denotes the contribution made by organization k to party j. We assume that a k;j 0 and b k;j 0. This speci…cation is ‡exible enough to capture very di¤erent situations. If group k does not have an organization then we set a k;j = b k;j = 0 for all j 2 P . If the leader of organization k has party preferences for party j then a k;j > a k;l and/or b k;j > b k;l . 21 If leader k is twice more e¤ective collecting contributions than leader h, then a k;j = 2a h;j and b k;j = 2b h;j . For the purposes of this paper the crucial distinction is between partisan organizations and non-partisan organizations. Since each organization "represents" the interest of a socioeconomic group, if each organization is attached to a party (i.e. the leader has a strong predilection for a particular party), then the party must indirectly adopt the policy preferences of this organization as the party preferences, al least to some extent. 22 De…nition 10 The stochastic spatial model with exogenous and endogenous valence is the two stage dynamic game end: = hP; V; Z; C; S; Li, where:
1. Players: P = f1; :::; pg is the set of all political parties, and V = fF X ; F Y ; F N ; Lg is the set of all groups of voters, which is also the set of all organization leaders.
Utility functions:
(a) S j : Z C ! [0; 1] is the expected vote share function of party j 2 P , obtained from (17) and (18) . Let
2 0 We usually assume that j depends only on the contributions made to party j; but in principle j could also be lowered by contribytions made to other parties. 2 1 Scho…eld (2007) considers a reduced form version of the organization contribution game, in which j is assumed a C 2 , concave function with a maximum at the ideal point of the organizations that support party j . For the two candidates case (19) provides microfundations for j . The key is to assume organizations with partisan preferences. 2 2 Roemer (2001) argues that "there is not, in general, free entry of representatives of classes into parties."
(b) L k : Z C ! < is the utility function of leader k 2 V given by (19) . Let
3. Sequence of play: First all organization leaders announce their campaign contribution functions. The parties then respond and simultaneously select platforms from the policy space Z. Then, organization leaders observe the pro…le of platforms and simultaneously implement their campaign contributions. Voters receive their signals and the election is held.
As Grossman and Helpman (1996) note, there are two equilibrium notions appropriate to this game. The …rst involves a commitment mechanism on the activists, having the e¤ect that their o¤ers, intended to in ‡uence the party leaders, are credible. Reputation, for example in a repeated play game, may su¢ ce. On the other hand, once the party leaders have made their policy pronouncements, then without a commitment device, only the electoral e¤ect will be relevant (because of the preferences of the activists for one party over another). Scho…eld (2006) avoids some of these di¢ culties by using a reduced form of the activist functions. The solution to this reduced form game is identical to one where the party leaders themselves have induced policy preferences, but still maximize vote shares. (See the policy preference models by Duggan and Fey [2005] and Peress [2010] ). In both cases, the solution concept is local subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
De…nition 11 A strict (weak) local subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the stochastic spatial model end: = hP; V; Z; C; S; L;i is a pro…le of party positions z 2 Z and a pro…le of contribution functions c 2 C such that:
1. For each political party j 2 P there exists an -neighborhood B (z j ) Z around z j such that
2.a. Under commitment. For each leader k 2 V there is no feasible contribution function c 0 k 2 C such that
where z 0 is such that for all j 2 P there exists an -neighborhood B (z 0 j ) Z around z 0 j such that
2.b. Under no commitment. For each leader k 2 V and each pro…le of party positions z there is no feasible contribution function c 0 k 2 C such that
Remark 1. If B (z j ) = B (z 0 j ) = Z and we consider only the weak inequality, then the de…nition above is just the usual one for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Remark 2. A general proof of existence of Nash equilibrium, and hence subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, can be obtained using Brouwer's …xed point theorem applied to the function space C , if we assume that the vote share functions are pseudo-concave and C consists of equicontinuous functions (Pugh, 2002) .
Let ! k be a measure of the power of organization k. 
Note that z m is an adjusted version of the weighted mean z m de…ned in section 3.1 (in fact if ! k = ! for all k, then z m = z m ). The di¤erence is that now better organized groups have a larger weight. Denote z m = j2P z m the joint adjusted weighted electoral mean of the stochastic spatial model. For purposes of exposition, we can develop the model with just two parties, and illustrate the equilibrium responses of organization leaders and parties. Let us suppose that there are only two parties and that the endogenous valence functions are linear in the contributions and the same for both parties, so that j = X k2V c k;j . Then, the probability that a voter in group k votes for party j rather than for party l 6 = j, for j = 1; 2, is:
As we noted above, there are two motives for organizations to provide contributions: an in ‡uence motive and an electoral motive. Once the parties have made their policy choices, then the electoral motive persists, but not the in ‡uence motive. Unless there is a commitment mechanism, activists need only consider the electoral motive in determining the contribution vector. Hence, if the there is no commitment mechanism, in order to determine optimal contributions after the platform pro…le z = (z 1 ; z 2 ) is announced, each organization leader maximizes (19) taking z = (z 1 ; z 2 ) as given. The …rst order solution of this problem is 23 :
In this case
l then each leader contributes at most to one party. If the equality holds then the leader does not contribute to any party. Adding up the …rst order conditions of all leaders we obtain the following expression:
Since, given z, (z; c) only depends on X 
Parties determine their optimal policy positions with respect to such a pro…le of no-commitment contribution functions. The problem for party j is to maximize S j (z) = S j (z; c (z)). Since S j (z) only involves C j l (z) and C j l is a di¤erentiable function of z, S j is also a di¤erentiable function of z. Hence we can again use calculus to solve each party problem. The …rst order necessary condition for party j is given by:
Here
Scho…eld (2006) obtained a similar expression for this "balance equation" in a reduced form of the activist game. Note that the di¤erence between this expression and (15) lies in the gradient term 2 DC j l (z), which Scho…eld (2006) called the "marginal activist pull."
The second order su¢ cient (necessary) condition is that the matrix D 2 S j (z) evaluated at a pro…le that satis…es the …rst order condition be negative de…nite (semide…nite)
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium platforms in this no commitment and two parties example.
Proposition 2 Consider the no commitment stochastic spatial model end: = hP; V; Z; C; S; Li,with exogenous and endogenous valence. Suppose that there are only two parties, F k is the extreme value distribution for all k, and the the utility functions L k are all concave functions of c k . Suppose further that j = X k2V c k;j . There are two cases to consider:
1. Suppose that the leaders of the organizations do not have partisan preferences, but they may vary in their in ‡uence ability, that is a k;j = a k and
The joint adjusted weighted electoral mean z m is the unique pro…le that simultaneously satis…es the …rst order condition (23) with both parties proposing the same platform. A su¢ cient (necessary) condition for z m to induce a strict (weak) local subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that the Hessian matrices, D 2 S j ( z m ) ;of both parties evaluated at z m , be negative de…nite (semide…nite).
2. On the other hand, assume that the leaders of the organizations have strong partisan preferences, in the following sense: There is a partition fV 1 ; V 2 g of V such that for all k 2 V 1 a k;1 > a k;2 and b k;1 > b k;2 , while for all k 2 V 2 a k;2 > a k;1 and b k;2 > b k;1 . Then, a pro…le z that satis…es the …rst order condition requires that each party be located between the electoral joint mean and the ideal policies of the organizations that support the party. A su¢ cient (necessary) condition for this pro…le to induce a strict (weak) local subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that the Hessian matrices, D 2 S j (z ), of both parties evaluated at z , be negative de…nite (semide…nite). Proof: See the appendix.
Note, from the second part of this proposition, that the "balance equation" implies that the equilibrium position of each party must involve a balance between the centripetal attraction of the electoral center and the centrifugal force of contributions. 24 
Trade policy under convergence
In section 3.2 we studied the determination of trade policy under the assumptions that political competition is purely electoral and parties' platforms converge. The idea behind this model is a situation in which the electoral franchise is extended to the whole population and groups do not have any extra power to in ‡uence policy besides elections. In general, this would not be an accurate representation for at least some countries and some periods of history. Introducing organizations other than political parties allows us to capture an additional source of political power created by how willing each group of voters is to provide contributions in exchange for preferable policies.
Consider a situation with only two parties, in which all activist leaders do not have partisan preferences, and the Hessian matrices of both parties evaluated at z m are negative de…nite. Then Proposition 2 (case 1) implies that the political equilibrium outcome is given by the adjusted weighted electoral mean z m = ( m ; m ) : This means that the more organized a group is, measured by ! k , the more impact the group has in the equilibrium outcome. Therefore, organizations can either moderate or reinforce the conclusions under the assumption of no organizations, depending on which group is able to increase its in ‡uence through campaign contributions. For instance, a land rich economy ( with structure 1) can be even closer to free trade if the landowner elite has relatively more lobby power than workers, and the nascent industrial capitalists. Alternatively, the landed elite in a moderately land abundant economy, but with a relatively important manufacturing industry (as in an economy with structure 2), can oppose the protectionist propensity of capitalists and workers, using its lobby power. It will be able to do this until such time as capitalists and workers build their own organizations and lobby power.
Thus the model suggests a very rich structure of institutional and economic path dependence. For example, a powerful landowner elite can maintain the economy very close to free trade, discouraging the growth of the secondary sector, and hence avoiding the emergence of a major protectionist force formed by capitalists and workers. It is also possible that an exogenous decrease in the international 2 4 Scho…eld (2006) noted this feature of a simple stochastic model involving activists where was a concave function of contributions, and suggested that the Hessian term, D 2 ; could be assumed to have negative eigenvalues of su¢ cient magnitude so as to induce a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. It would be attractive if this simple model could be extended to a more complex game where organization and party leaders bargain over contributions, as suggested in Scho…eld and Miller (2007) . Such a formal analysis is quite di¢ cult except under simplifying assumptions such as used in this Proposition, but it would also provide a model of activist in ‡uence as discussed in Grossman and Helpman (1996) . terms of trade leads to a su¢ cient growth in the secondary sector, which turns workers in the tradable sector into a protectionist force. The lobby power of landowners and service workers can o¤set this protectionist impulse for some time. Eventually capitalists and "tradable" workers counterbalance this force by building their own lobby power and creating a more protectionist equilibrium.
Once the economy is in a protectionist equilibrium, landlords and service workers may try to respond by defranchising workers in the tradable sector and suppressing their organizations. Eventually workers in tradable industries will switch to become supporters of free trade. Hence, it is very natural to imagine exogenous and endogenous switches between structures 1 and 2. It is much more complicated to picture this kind of switch in a capital abundant economy, since all groups, except landlords, prefer either free trade or a very moderate protectionism.
In summary, if the introduction of organizations increases the power of the owners of the factor speci…c to the exporting industry and/or service workers, then the equilibrium trade policy comes closer to free trade. If it increases the power of the owners of the factor speci…c to the industry that competes with the imports or of workers in the tradable industries, the equilibrium trade policy becomes more protectionist.
Economic structure, political power and convergence
The way activists in ‡uence the convergence coe¢ cients is subtle. Again, assume that there are only two parties and activist leaders do not have partisan preferences (case 1 in proposition 2), then it is possible that convergence is more or less likely with activists than without them. The reason is that the endogenous components of valence have an ambiguous e¤ect on the Hessian matrices of both parties evaluated at z m . On the other hand, if activist leaders have partisan preferences (case 2 in proposition 2), campaign contributions constitute an unambigouos centrifugal force, inducing each party to trade o¤ the electoral mean and the ideal position of the organizations that support the party.
Trade policy under divergence
Consider a situation with two political parties. Party 1 receives contributions from organizations k = F X ; F Y ; F N while party 2 receives contributions from organization L. Let z j = ( j ; j ) be the equilibrium platform of party j = 1; 2. Regardless the structure of the economy, in equilibrium, party 1 o¤ers a lower fraction of government revenue allocated to G F than the electoral mean, and party 2 o¤ers a higher fraction of government revenue allocated to G L than the electoral mean. That is 2 > m > 1 (proposition 2, case 2). The reason is fairly intuitive. When party 1 is choosing a platform, then in order to maximize campaign contributions it must balance a centrifugal force that pushes it to the electoral center m , and a centripetal force that pushes it to k = 0, the ideal policy of the organizations that support the party.
The same logic applies to party 2 with L = 1. The importance of each of these force varies with political parameters. All else equal, the more e¤ective activists leaders are and the more e¤ective contributions are, the more intense is the centripetal force, and thus the further apart 2 and 1 will be. Furthermore, ceteris paribus, the higher is the exogenous valence of a party the closer it is to the electoral mean.
The structure of the economy has, however, an important e¤ect on j . If the economy has either structure 1 or 3, the ideal export tax rate of workers in the tradable industries L tends to be very close to the electoral mean m . If the in ‡uence ability of the organizations k = F X ; F Y ; F N does not vary too much, it is also the case that the weighted ideal export tax rate of these groups is also very close to m .Therefore, 1 2 m , and parties' platform do not have a signi…cant variation in terms of the proposed trade policy. On the other hand, if the economy has structure 2, and the fraction of the owners of factor F Y in the population is not very high, so L > m , which implies that 2 > m . Moreover, if the in ‡uence ability of organizations k = F X ; F Y ; F N does not vary too much, it is also the case that the weighted ideal export tax rate of these groups must be lower than m , which implies that 1 < m . Therefore, 2 > m > 1 , and parties'platform di¤er signi…cantly in terms of the proposed trade policy. Recall also that m is higher for an economy with structure 2 than for an economy with structures 1 or 3. Hence, party 2 o¤ers a highly protectionist policy, while party 1 proposes a relatively moderate one.
Summing up, for an economy with structures 1 or 3, both parties tend to propose a very similar and moderate trade policy, while they sharply di¤er in their budget proposal. Party 1 o¤ers more G F and party 2 more G L . Most of the political con ‡ict is about the budget allocation dimension.
On the other hand, for an economy with structure 2, parties tend to di¤er in both dimensions. Party 1 o¤ers a moderate trade policy and more G F , while party 2 o¤ers a highly protectionist trade policy and more G L . There is political con ‡ict in both dimensions of trade policy and budget allocation.
Finally, note that for an economy with structures 1 and 3, the e¢ ciency of the economy does not signi…cantly vary when there is a change in the party that wins the election, since both parties propose similar trade policies. Distributional con ‡ict mainly occur in the budget allocation, which does not a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the economy. However, for an economy with structure 2, party rotation induces signi…cant changes in the e¢ ciency of the economy since each party implements a very di¤erent trade policy.
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have explored the political and economic consequences of the theoretical model of political economy that was presented in sections 2 and 3 of the paper. We have focused our attention on three main issues. First, we have assumed that the su¢ cient conditions for policy convergence are satis…ed and we have characterized the equilibrium outcome. We have stressed the role of the economic structure in the political equilibrium, and have shown how trade policy is a¤ected by changes in political institutions, such as the lobby power of each group, as well as by economic shocks in the international terms of trade. The model also suggests that path dependent trade policies can emerge as the equilibrium response of the political game to temporary changes in the economic environment and political institutions.
Second, we have discussed the convergence conditions. In particular we have studied how likely it is that an economic structure induces policy convergence. Here the emphasis has been on policy stability, rather than on comparing the equilibrium levels of protection induced by di¤erent economic and political structures. This is a point that has not been emphasized in the traditional literature of the political economy of international trade. However, we think it is a relevant one, because high volatility and sudden changes in trade policies have been considered important impediments to growth in many developing countries.
Third, we have studied and interpreted the political equilibrium under divergence. In particular, we have shown that there can exist a political equilibrium in which there is a positive probability of a "populist" outcome with a high level of protection and more public goods for unskilled workers. In addition there can exist a "middle class" outcome with a relatively lower level of protection and more public goods for speci…c factors. We interpret this result to mean that, in equilibrium, society can switch from one of these outcomes to the other.
Fourth, globalization has recently been a powerful force in bringing about economic convergence across many countries (see O'Rourke and Williamson [1999] ). When there was a backlash against globalization after the 1930 crisis, the result was economic divergence. For many developing countries, this backlash lasted for almost 50 years. Today, there is a persistent fear of a repeat of the past, that the current economic crisis will again induce a backlash against world market integration. Though this is possible, our analysis suggest that the risk of it is less likely than it was eighty years ago. The main reason is the growth of the service economy through world. As we have shown, the development of the non-tradeable sector in the economy plays a key role in political alignments, since service workers push the political equilibrium toward the ideal position of the relative abundant factor in the economy. Therefore, they act as a moderating force against the protectionist tendency.
To conclude, we return to the example of Argentina mentioned in the introduction. It is fair to say that at the beginning of the 20th century Argentina's factor endowment resembled what we denoted here as a specialized natural resource-rich economy. However, during the interwar period; trade opportunities and the terms of trade worsened and these triggered an industrialization process. This accelerated with the world depression during the 1930s and the Second World War. As a result, Argentina started the second half of the 20th century with a very di¤erent economic con…guration. Industrialization had come a long way, bringing about what we have called a diversi…ed natural resource-rich economy (see Galiani and Somaini [2009] ). These new economic conditions also changed the political equilibrium; urban workers employed in the manufacturing sector and industrialists were the major social actors and they demanded a deepening of the industrialization process. This took the economy close to autarky.
Indeed, the pre 1930 Argentine society remained on the whole ‡exible, and social mobility was about as high as in other countries of recent settlement. The majority of the elite, although wealthy and powerful, remained attached to a liberal ideology until at least the 1920s, as witnessed by the educational system (see Galiani et al. [2008] ). It is not inconceivable that a few more decades of an expanding world economy would have induced acceleration in the growth of urban leadership which could have reconciled the aspirations of urban workers, entrepreneurs, and rural masses with a gradual decline in rural exportable commodities. Yet such a balancing act, even under prosperous conditions, was di¢ cult in Argentina. The main problem that arose was that policies which were best from the viewpoint of economic e¢ ciency (e.g., free, or nearly free, trade) generate an income distribution favorable to the owners of the relatively most abundant factor of production (land). This strengthens the position of the traditional elite. In Argentina, contrary to what occurred in the United States or Britain, by the end of Second World War, what was e¢ cient was not popular (Diaz Alejandro [1970] ). Once workers voted on a large scale for the …rst time in 1946, an urban-rural cleavage developed under the leadership of Peron. This coalition not only shifted trade policy but it also signi…cantly modi…ed the distribution of public expenditures towards the low-income class. In the 21st century, though Argentina still has a diversi…ed natural resource-rich economic structure, the rise of the service economy has debilitated the supremacy of the 'populist' coalition and its policy can no longer be viewed in terms of an urban-rural cleavage (see Galiani and Somaini [2009] ). At present, either a coalition of the rural sector and the urban middle class nor a coalition of unskilled workers and the industrialist (that compete with imports) can win a democratic election in Argentina.
This brief sketch indicates how the electoral preferred degree of protection can be transformed as a result of essentially political changes in the balance of power between landed and capital elites, in coalition with di¤erent elements of enfranchised labor.
The …rst line uses the de…nition of w F X =CP I;p X ; the second line computes w F X ;p X from the pro…t maximization of …rms in industry X; the third line uses (5) 
The …rst and second line are evident; the third line uses (5) . The …nal expression is positive for all 2 (0; aut: ] and zero for = 0; which implies that (w F N =CP I) is decreasing in for all 2 [0; aut: ].
Now consider an economy with a comparative advantage in industry
The …rst line uses the de…nition of w F X =CP I;p Y ; the second line computes w F X ;p Y from the pro…t maximization of …rms in industry X. The …nal expression is negative for all 2 [0; aut: ]; which implies that (w F X =CP I) is strictly increasing in for all 2 [0; aut: ] The elasticity of w F Y =CP I w.r.t. p Y is given by 25 
Proof of Lemma 3: mobile factor
Suppose that the economy is specialized in X, that is = 0. Then
The second line computes w L ;p X from pro…t maximization in industry X, and the third line uses (5) . The …nal expression is clearly positive, which implies that (w L =CP I) is decreasing in for all 2 [0; aut: ].
Suppose that the economy has a comparative advantage in X, but it is not specialized, that is 0 < <
The second line computes w L ;p X from the pro…t maximization of …rms in industry Y ; the third line uses (4) and (5); the fourth line employs two facts:
is increasing in and (1 X ) l X ;p X X 0;
and the …fth line uses the fact that
The second line uses two facts:
is increasing in and (1 X ) l X ;p X X 0; and the third line uses the expression of l Y ( aut: ). The …nal expression is negative.
Finally 
1.
Step 3: p N ;p Y 1 and C1 ) w L =CP I;p Y > 0
The second line computes from the pro…t maximization of …rms in industry X; the third line uses (4); the fourth line employs the assumption p N ;p Y 1 and the fact that 
Proof of lemma 4: Ideal policies
Since v k ( ; ) is a continuous function and the policy space Z is a compact set, a global maximum k ; k exists. Since v k ( ; ) is strictly increasing in for k = L and strictly decreasing in for k = F X ; F Y ; F N we have k = 0 for k = F X ; F Y ; F N and L = 1. The ideal tax rate k must be interior because for = 0 and = aut government revenue is zero and H 0 (0) ! 1. Therefore, the derivative of v k ( ; ) with respect to evaluated at k ; k must be equal to zero, or which is equivalent k must satis…es:
Suppose an economy with structure 1. It is not di¢ cult to verify from the proof of lemmas 2 and 3 that w F X =CP I;p X > w F N =CP I;p X > w L =CP I;p X > 0, and w F Y =CP I;p X < 0. Since H 0 (0) ! 1 and
, the previous expression implies that F X < F N < L < max < F Y . An analogous argument applies for an economy with structure 3, just reversing the roles of F X and F Y . For an economy with structure 2, again it is not di¢ cult to verify that w F X =CP I;p X > w F N =CP I;p X > 0, and w F Y =CP I;p X < w L =CP I;p X < 0, which implies that F X < F N < max < L < F Y .
Proof of propositions 1
As we have already shown, the joint weighted electoral mean, z m ; satis…es the …rst order condition for local equilibrium for all parties (15) . Hence, in order to verify that z m is a strict local Nash equilibrium, we only need to check whether the Hessian matrix of each party evaluated at z m is negative de…nite. To prove that c ( exo: ) < 1 is su¢ cient for D 2 S j (z m ) to be negative de…nite for all j 2 P , we proceed as follows. We have de…ned the characteristic matrix as H j (z m ) = X k2V n k A j W k B k zm W k W k . Then, the Hessian matrix of party j evaluated at z m is given by:
Since 2 j (z m ) 1 j (z m ) is a positive constant, D 2 S j (z m ) is negative de…nite (semide…nite) if and only if H j (z m ) is negative de…nite (semide…nite). The trace of H j (z m ) is given by Therefore, if d ( exo: ) < 1, then Tr(H j (z m )) < 0 for all j 2 P . The determinant of H j (z m ) is given by
By the triangle inequality, the sum of the …rst two terms in this expression for det (H j (z m )) must be non-negative. Therefore, if c ( exo: ) < 1, then det (H j (z m )) > 0 for all j 2 P . Since d ( exo: ) < c ( exo: ), then c ( exo: ) < 1 implies that Tr(H j (z m )) < 0, and det (H j (z m )) > 0 for all j 2 P . Thus c ( exo: ) < 1 is a su¢ cient condition for D 2 S j (z m ) to be negative de…nite for all j 2 P:This completes the proof of su¢ ciency For the necessary part, assume that z m is a weak local Nash equilibrium. Then the Hessian matrix of each party evaluated at z m must be negative semide…nite. This implies det D 2 S j (z m ) 0 and Tr D 2 S j (z m ) 0 for all j 2 P . This is true if and only if det H 2 j (z m ) 0 and Tr H 2 j (z m ) 0 for all j 2 P . Tr(H 1 (z m )) 0 if and only if d ( exo: ) 1. If d ( exo: ) > 1; then Tr(H 1 (z m )) must be strictly positive, and so one of the eigenvalues of H 1 (z m ) must be strictly positive, violating the weak Nash equilibrium condition. This completes the proof of necessity.
Proof of proposition 2
Suppose non partisan organizations and that the in ‡uence ability of each organization is the same for both parties. Then, from (22) is not di¢ cult to check that if we consider a pro…le z such that z 1 = z 2 = ( ; ) then: (i) C j (z) = C l (z) = 0, (ii) 1 (z) = [1 + exp ( 2 1 )] 1 , and (iii)
